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which  regional  governments determine  regional  environmental policies  to  control 
correlated  transboundary  pollutants  and  the  center  implements  interregional 
income  transfers.  We  examine  policy  making  under  horizontal  and  hierarchical 
federal structures. In a horizontal structure, federal and regional governments make 
simultaneous  policy  choices.  In  hierarchical  structures,  federal  and  regional 
governments  make  sequential  policy  choices.  Sequential  choices  may  feature 
centralized  or  decentralized  leadership.  Our  results  indicate  that  hierarchical 
federal  structures  characterized  by  decentralized  leadership  may  be  socially 
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Most federal systems are characterized by interregional redistribution and policy making 
to address interregional spillovers. In the United States, there are many forms of federal 
grants that attempt to reduce regional (i.e., state) income disparities. Similarly, in the 
European Union, interregional redistribution schemes are in place to maintain cohesion 
and reduce income disparities amongst its objective regions. Perhaps, the clearest 
example of federal policy that attempts to address interregional spillovers is 
environmental policy making for the control of transboundary air pollutants, such as 
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, the main sources of acid rain. This form of federal 
policy is widely observable in the United States, the European Union and Canada, to cite 
just a few federal systems. 
 More recently, the European Union launched the second phase of the European 
Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in order to account for some of the damages 
that are caused by emissions of greenhouse gases from significant European air polluting 
sources.1 A similar cap and trade program for the United States was part of President 
Barack Obama's agenda, but it stalled at the Senate in 2010 after passing in the House. 
Even though the United States has not yet implemented such an emissions trading 
scheme for greenhouse gases, it may become a reality in the future if President Obama is 
reelected.2 
 Another key characteristic of federal systems is harmful tax competition. For 
example, as a clear demonstration that harmful tax competition has been a major concern 
in Europe, the European Union adopted in December 1 1997 the Code of Conduct for 
                                                 
1 For a detailed description of the EU ETS, see http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm. 
2 See http://change.gov/agenda/energy_and_environment_agenda/. 
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business taxation to induce the member nations to reduce existing tax policies that 
produced harmful competition as well as to inhibit the implementation of such tax 
policies in the future.3 For the United States, Devereux et al. (2007) find evidence of 
harmful tax competition for cigarettes amongst neighboring states and for gasoline 
amongst state and federal governments. More recently, however, Chirinko and Wilson 
(2011) find evidence that, in the United States, the average state, in setting its capital tax 
policy, reacts negatively rather than positively to changes in capital taxes in neighboring 
states. This finding runs counter to the "race to the bottom" phenomenon typically 
associated with tax competition in federal systems. 
 In this paper, we consider the interplay of regional environmental policy designed 
to control net emissions of air transboundary pollutants, federal redistributive policy and 
horizontal tax competition between two regions that compete to attract capital. Our main 
settings are hierarchical federal systems in which two levels of government, federal and 
regional, have divided responsibility over implementation of socially desirable policies. 
The federal policy attempts to reduce regional inequality. The motivation for the regional 
environmental policy is to reduce pollution damages. Tax competition emerges from the 
facts that capital is mobile and the regional governments are obliged to utilize capital 
taxes to finance regional provision of air pollution abatement. 
 Silva and Caplan (1997) considered the potential pitfalls that divided 
responsibility between federal and regional governments over control of transboundary 
pollutants can have in hierarchical federal systems. They demonstrated that a federal 
system which features decentralized leadership, similar to the prevalent system in the 
                                                 




European Union, may be socially superior to a federal system which features centralized 
leadership, similar to the prevalent system in the United States. Decentralized leadership 
dominates centralized leadership whenever regional welfare functions are quasilinear and 
the center, which cares about equity across regions, promotes interregional transfers. The 
subsequent paper by Caplan and Silva (1999) made the superiority of decentralized 
leadership even sharper, since in their setup decentralized leadership was socially 
efficient even when the center did not care about equity, and thus did not pursue 
redistribution across region. Decentralized leadership is shown to be superior whenever 
the regional governments choose pollution taxes and subsequently the center decides on 
the levels of pollution abatements the regions should produce. 
 The efficiency properties of decentralized leadership in federal-like institutional 
arrangements that attempt to control transboundary pollutants have been shown to be 
applicable to the Kyoto Protocol (see, e.g., Caplan et al (2003)) and to hybrid pollution 
control arrangements that may combine environmental policies for domestic and 
international pollution control (e.g., Aoyama and Silva (2008), Caplan and Silva (2005), 
Silva and Zhu (2009)) and for continental and global pollution control (e.g., Silva and 
Zhu (2011)). Of particular relevance to this paper is the framework introduced by Caplan 
and Silva (2005) in which pollution emission sources emit multiple correlated pollutants 
and the technology that is adopted to abate such emissions is coarse, in the sense that it is 
not finely designed to abate each type of pollution emission but to abate all pollutants 
(possibly at varying degrees). 
 The literature on interregional tax competition is vast (see, e.g., Wilson (1986, 
1999) and Wildasin (1989)). Wilson (1986) states that “…tax competition exists if and 
4 
 
only if a rise in a single region’s public service output causes capital to flow out of the 
region.” (p.303). Wilson (1986) also shows that financing the provision of a local public 
good by levying a capital tax is inefficient. Wildasin provides an intuitive explanation for 
the inefficiency caused by capital tax competition: “The inefficiency associated with tax 
competition can be understood as a kind of externality. This externality occurs because an 
increase in the tax rate in one jurisdiction causes a flow of capital to other jurisdictions 
that increases their tax revenue.” (Wildasin 1989, p.194). Wilson (1999) surveys the large 
literature on tax competition and focuses on the tension there exists between Oates’ 
(1972) claim that tax competition is wasteful and Tiebout’s (1956) theory of local public 
good provision which calls for decentralization and competition at the local level to 
improve efficiency.4 
 As illustrated in studies of tax competition, regional governments in many 
federations adopt distortive taxation to finance the provision of public goods and services. 
In some papers, the regionally financed public goods may generate interregional 
consumption benefits. A particularly important example is Cremer and Gahvari (2004). 
These authors study tax competition in the presence of transboundary pollution. The 
regional governments control two policy instruments, an output tax and a pollution tax. In 
the absence of pollution, the regional governments would have incentives to lower their 
output taxes in order to attract capital, characterizing a race to the bottom. In the presence 
of pollution and without capital mobility, however, the regional governments may wish to 
set pollution taxes at levels that equate the marginal regional pollution damages. The 
                                                 
4 Hindricks et al. (2008) is related to this paper in that it considers settings in which tax competition occurs 
in the presence of equalization policies. The authors show that tax competition leads to underprovision of 
public investments and that equalization grants discourage public investments. This paper differs from 
theirs in many ways, including the fact that we consider settings with transboundary pollution.  
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authors demonstrate that uncoordinated government typically set inefficient 
environmental taxes, leading to too much pollution relative to the first-best level, and 
choose output taxes that support the "race to the bottom" argument.  
 In a recent paper, Hadjiyiannis et al. (2009) provide evidence that in most OECD 
countries over 40% of the costs of providing pollution abatement and control are financed 
by public expenditures. The authors utilize this fact in conjunction with the facts that 
transboundary pollution is ubiquitous and capital is internationally mobile to build a 
general equilibrium model in which regional provision of pollution abatement and tax 
competition are explicitly considered to analyze the efficiency of environmental policy 
designed by the governments of two politically independent regions (nations). They show 
that pollution taxes are efficiently chosen when countries are symmetric, but are 
inefficient when countries are asymmetric. Among other things, our paper differs from 
theirs in that we consider redistributive transfers and hierarchical federal structures. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 
provides the center’s most preferable allocation. Section 4 examines the three federal 
policy scenarios. This section provides the main results of this study. Section 5 concludes 
the paper. 
2. The Federal Economy 
Consider a federation consisting of two regions, two autonomous regional governments 
and one central government. Each region is indexed by ,j  .2,1j  There are jn  








jnN For simplicity, we consider a model in which there is 
production of a single composite (numeraire) good.  
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 The production process for the numeraire good in region j  generates emissions 
of two types of pollutants: 0jS   units of sulfur dioxide, which causes acid rain damages, 
and 0jC   units of carbon dioxide, which causes climate change damages. Acid rain 
damages depend, among other things, on wind patterns and the (ground) resources (e.g., 
rivers, fish, fauna, infrastructure) available in a particular region. To distinguish from 
acid rain damages, we assume that climate change damages are solely associated with 
damages caused by deteriorating air quality. Air quality is equally shared by all residents 
of the federation.  
In most of what follows, pollution abatement is provided by the regional 
governments. These governments may use a coarse abatement technology to 
simultaneously abate emissions of the two types of air pollutants. The technology 
produces pollution abatement utilizing the numeraire good as an input: it takes one unit of 
the numeraire good to produce one unit of pollution abatement. 
In the absence of pollution abatement, the ground-level environmental quality in 
region j  is ,j j jj j mj mL Z S S    where 0jZ   is the ground-level environmental 
quality that nature provides to residents of the region in the absence of acidic deposition 
and jj j mj mS S   is the total amount of acidic deposition in the region, for  0,1jj   
and  0,1mj  , , 1, 2,j m   j m . Thus, region j  suffers from acidic deposition which 
is in part caused by its own sulfur dioxide emission (i.e., the domestic component) and in 
part caused by the other region's sulfur dioxide emission (i.e., the transboundary or 
imported component). Note that 11 12 1    and 22 21 1    and that we allow for 
asymmetric transboundary sulfur dioxide depositions because we do not impose the 
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restriction that 12 21  . In the absence of pollution abatement, the domestic and 
imported components of the acidic deposition in a region depend on regional sulfur 
emission levels and on exogenous wind patterns. The latter determine 11  and 22 .  
By employing the coarse abatement technology and producing jg  units of 
pollution abatement, regional government j  can reduce its sulfur emission by  jg  
units, where we assume that  0 0,  0   and 0   for all 0jg   and  
 0lim jg jg    . The Inada condition guarantees that 0jg   in every allocation 
examined in this paper. Hence, region 'j s ground-level environmental quality function is 
     , .j j m j jj j j mj m mL g g Z S g S g             Region j 's ground-level 
environmental quality produces a benefit of   ,j j j mB B L g g units to each resident of 
the region. We assume that that 0B   and 0B   for all 0jL   and that 
 0lim jL jB L    . The Inada condition guarantees that 0jL  , 1, 2j  , throughout. 
Letting 0Y   denote federal air quality in the absence of carbon dioxide 
emissions and 1 2C C C   denote the total amount of carbon dioxide emitted in the 
federation, federal air quality is   ,Q G Y G C    where 1 2G g g   denotes the total 
amount of carbon dioxide that is abated at the federal level. The benefit any individual in 
the federation derives from air quality is given by the function   A Q G . We assume 
that for all 0Q  , 0A   and 0A   and that  0limQ A Q    . The Inada condition 
guarantees that 0Q  . 
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For tractability, we assume that the utility of an individual who resides in region 
j  is        , , , ,j j j m j j m j j mU x g g x A Q g g B L g g    where jx represents the 
quantity of the composite private good consumed by the individual. Given our modeling 
assumptions, one can interpret the first component of an individual's utility function as a 
Cobb-Douglas sub-utility function for the numeraire good and air quality provided that 
the transformation function,  A  , takes the form    ,  0,1A Q Q   .  
We shall assume throughout that each regional government is benevolent and has 
Benthamite preferences over residents’ welfare levels. Letting jR denote the welfare level 
in region j , this assumption implies that jjj UnR  . The central government is in charge 
of interregional redistribution. The center possesses a general Bergson-Samuelson social 
welfare function. The center’s utility is  1 2,W R R . We assume that this function is 
strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable and satisfies the following conditions: 
,0jW ,0jjW ,0jmW  where ,jj RWW   mjjm RRWW 
2  and  
,22 jjj RWW   ,2,1, mj  .mj   The center possesses an income tax instrument, 
which it can use to tax and redistribute income across regions. Let j  denote the income 
transfer received (if positive) or paid (if negative) by a resident in region .j  The 





jjn   
Let us now consider the supply side of the federal economy. In region ,j  there 
are jn  units of labor, jE  units of an energy-generating resource (say, coal), and jK  units 
of capital. For simplicity, we assume that the regional supplies of labor and coal are fixed 
because labor and energy markets are regional and there is no mobility of either labor or 
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coal across regions. Each individual in region j  is endowed with one unit of labor, 
j jE n units of coal and j jK n  units of capital. Each individual supplies his/her labor 
unit and her coal units inelastically in the region in which he or she resides. Each 
individual also supplies his or her capital units in the economy-wide capital market. The 
total amount of capital units supplied in the economy-wide capital market is 1 2K K K  . 
The competitive industry in region j  rents jk  units of capital and employs jn  
units of labor and jE  units of coal to produce    ; ,j j j j j jF k n E f k  units of the 
numeraire good. We assume that the production function  j jf k  is increasing in its 
argument, strictly concave, twice continuously differentiable and satisfies the following 
Inada condition:  0lim .jk j jf k      The production function exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale due to the regionally fixed labor and coal factors. The Inada condition 
implies that the capital input is essential in production. For simplicity, we assume that 
each unit of coal utilized in region j  generates one unit of sulfur dioxide and one unit of 
carbon dioxide, which are emitted in the atmosphere. Thus, j j jS C E  , 1, 2j  . 
 The profit of the industry in region j  is     ,j j j j j j j j jf k r t k w n E       
where 0r  is the economy-wide rental rate, 0jt   is the regional capital tax rate levied 
by the regional government to finance provision of pollution abatement, and 0jw   and 
0j   are the labor wage and coal price in region j . In order to capture the effects of 
interregional capital tax competition on regional environmental policy making, we 
restrict our model by assuming that the regional governments do not have lump-sum 
taxes at their disposal. 
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 Since the technology features decreasing returns to scale, profits are positive in 
equilibrium. Letting j jr t    denote the rental rate after tax in region ,j  the first order 
condition for profit maximization is   ,j j jf k    from which we derive the factor 
demand functions,   ,j jk   1, 2.j   Observe that    1 0.j j j jk f k    
 The economy-wide capital market clears when    1 1 2 2 .k k K    Since 
,j jr t    1, 2,j   this condition enables us to implicitly define the rental rate as 
function of the capital tax rates,  1 2, .r t t  Plugging this function into the market-clearing 
condition and differentiating with respect to jt  yields 
   ,0,121  ffftr mj ,2,1, mj .mj       (1a) 
Conditions (1a) are standard in the tax competition literature; they are the marginal 
rental-rate functions (see, e.g., Wildasin (1989)). 
 Each individual in region j  obtains  1 2, j jr t t K n  units of rental income from 
capital, j j jE n  units of rental income from coal, jw  units of labor income, and j jn  
units of profit. Profits are not expatriated. The budget constraint for any resident of region 
j  is             ,,,,, 21212121 jjjjjjjjjj nttkttKttrttkfx   where 
   1 2 1 2, , ,j jt t r t t t    1, 2.j   Adding up the individual budget constraints yields the 
regional resource constraints, for 1,2,j   
            1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , .j j j j j j j j j j j j jn x t k t t f k t t r t t K k t t n         (1b) 




  1 2, ,j j j jg t k t t  1, 2.j         (1c) 
The left-hand side of each equation (1c) represents the governmental expenditure 
incurred in region j  to provide pollution abatement. It takes one unit of numeraire to 
provide one unit of pollution abatement. Since the Inada conditions for the numeraire and 
sulfur-abatement production functions guarantee that in any equilibrium we must have 
0jk   and 0jg   in equilibrium, equations (1c) inform us that we must also have  
0,jt   1, 2.j   Equations (1c) enable us to express the regional pollution abatement 
levels as functions of the capital tax rates,     1 2 1 2, ,j j j jg t t t k t t , 1, 2j  . It follows 
that  
   . . 1j j j j j jg t k t k r t                 (1d) 
where      ,01.  jjj trkt  1, 2.j   
   ,0.  mjjmj trkttg  , 1, 2,j m   .j m       (1e) 
These conditions demonstrate that any increase in a region’s capital tax rate 
causes outflow of capital to the other region. Therefore, the regions are tempted to set 
low capital tax rates in order to increase the total capital supply in the region. These 
results are standard in the literature (see, e.g., Wilson (1986) and Wildasin (1989)).   
 We use the budget constraint for the representative resident to define 
            1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , ,j j j j j j j j j j jx t t f k t t r t t K t t k t t n           
, 1, 2,j m   j m . It follows that 
1 jjx   and ,0 mjx   ,2,1, mj ,mj      (1f) 
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        , , ,j j j j j j j m j j j m jx t r t K k t t k t t n          ,2,1j   (1g) 
      , ,j m m j j j j m jx t r t K k t t n        , 1, 2,j m   .j m    (1h) 
Equation (1f) tells us that the consumption of the numeraire good of the representative 
resident of region j  varies at one-to-one rate with the interregional income transfer he or 
she receives or pays from the central government.  
3. The Center’s Most Preferable Allocation 
In this section, we consider the center’s most preferable allocation. This is the socially 
optimal allocation, which serves as our benchmark. For comparison purposes, we assume 
that the center must also utilize capital taxes to finance provision of pollution abatement 
in each region. The center chooses  
1,2






jjn            (2a)  
To facilitate future comparisons, we solve the center’s maximization problem in two 
steps. First, we assume that the center chooses  
2,1jj
  to maximize  21, RRW  subject to 
(2a) for fixed regional capital tax rates. This allows us to obtain the socially optimal 
interregional transfer levels as functions of the capital tax rates. We then plug the optimal 
income transfer functions into the social welfare function and optimize with respect to the 
regional capital tax rates. 
Since            1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , , ,j j j j j j mR n x t t A Q G t t B L g t t g t t    where 
     1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2, , ,G t t g t t g t t  , the first order conditions in the first step are the constraint 
(2a) and the following equations, for 2,1j : 
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    1 2        j j j j jW R x n W A G W W            (2b) 
Equation (2b) is implied by equation (1f). According to equation (2b), the center’s 
optimal redistribution scheme equalizes the social marginal utilities of income. Equations 
(2a) and (2b) define  ,, 21 ttj .2,1j  Let us     212121 ,,,, ttttxttx jjj   and 
            1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2, , , , , ,j j j j j mR t t n x t t A Q G B L g t t g t t     , 1, 2,j m    .j m  
 Plugging  ,, 21 ttj  1, 2,j   into equation (2a) and differentiating the implied 





jii tn           (2c) 




 to maximize     1 1 2 2 1 2, , ,W R t t R t t . The first 
































 1, 2.j          (2d) 
where 
   ,i i ii
i j j
R







 ,2,1, ji       (2e) 























































R  .2,1, ji  (2f) 






21,  and ,021 WW  substituting equations (1f)-(1h), (2e) and (2f) 
into equations (2d) yields  


















































 .2,1j  (2g) 
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Combining equations (2c) and (2g), we obtain: 

































 .2,1j    (2h) 
Equations (2h) are modified Samuelson conditions. The condition show the equalization 
of the sum of the marginal rates of substitution between pollution abatement and 
numeraire and the marginal social cost, which is the rate which capital is sacrificed for 
the provision of the regional pollution abatement products. The marginal rates of 
substitution between pollution abatement and numeraire contain two components, one 
which gives us the marginal social benefit of improving air quality and another which 
gives us the marginal social benefits of improving ground-level environmental quality in 
both regions. The socially optimal allocation is characterized by equations (1b), (1c), (2a), 
(2b) and (2h). 
4. Federal Policy Game 
We are now ready to consider federal policy making. There are three policy games: 
simultaneous policy making, decentralized leadership and centralized leadership. We 
compare each equilibrium allocation with the center’s most preferable allocation. Our 
analysis will enable us to clearly demonstrate the effects produced by the timing in 
federal policy making on efficiency and equity. 
4.1 Simultaneous Policy Making 
In the simultaneous game, the central government chooses  
2,1jj
  to maximize 
 21, RRW  subject to constraint (2a) and  ,,; 21 ttx jj  2,1j , taking   2,1jjt  as given. 
Each regional authority chooses  jt  to maximize jR  subject to  jmjj ttx ,;  and 
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 21, ttg j , taking   2,1, jmj t  as given, 2,1, mj  and .mj   Since the center’s problem 
is identical to the problem it solved in section 3 except that here it does not control the 
regional policies, the solution for the center’s maximization problem is given by 
equations (2a) and (2b).  
Let us now consider the equilibrium allocation implied by the regions’ 
maximization problems. The first order conditions are 
       
2
1
0,j j ij j j j j ij i
ij j j
R x g




                       
 1, 2.j   (3a) 
Inserting equation (1g) into equations (3a), we obtain  




,ij j j j ij i j j j
i j j
g r
n x A Q n B L g k K k
A Q t t
 

                   
 1, 2.j   (3b) 
Pollution abatement products are determined according to conditions (3b). In each region, 
the rule equalizes the regional marginal rates of substitution between pollution abatement 
and numeraire and the regional marginal cost. Equations (3b) clearly demonstrate that the 
regional governments ignore interregional spillovers. This fact leads each region to 
under-provide pollution abatement . 
In sum, the equilibrium allocation for the simultaneous game is characterized by 
equations, (1b), (1c), (2a), (2b) and (3b). Comparing this allocation with the socially 
optimal allocation leads us to the following conclusion:  
Proposition 1. The equilibrium for the simultaneous game is characterized by socially 
optimal redistribution and fully decentralized capital tax policies. Therefore, the 
allocation is socially equitable but inefficient. 
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 The center finds it desirable to intervene in the federal setting with simultaneous 
policy making because it has a strong taste for equity, as captured by the decreasing 
marginal social utilities of income. Thus, although the equilibrium for the simultaneous 
policy game examined here is not socially optimal, it represents an improvement in social 
welfare relative to a situation in which the center does not intervene. The latter would 
follow, for example, if the structure of the federal system was completely decentralized, 
with each regional government also being in charge of promoting intra-regional income 
transfers.  
4.2 Decentralized Leadership 
In this section, we show that federal policy making under decentralized leadership 
represents a social improvement relative to simultaneous federal policy making. The 
sequential game is as follows: 
Stage 1: Regional government j chooses nonnegative  jt  to maximize  21, ttR j  
taking the choices of all other regional government as given, .2,1j  
Stage 2: The center observes the regional policy makings and then chooses 
nonnegative  
2,1jj
  to maximize     1 1 2 2 1 2, , ,W R t t R t t  subject to the 
federation’s resource constraint (2a). 
The equilibrium concept for the two-stage game is subgame perfection. 
Applying backward induction, we first consider the second stage of the game. 
Since the center’s problem is identical to the problem it solved in section 3 except that 
here it does not control the regional policies, the solution in the second stage is given by 
equations (2a) and (2b). The center’s best response functions are  ,, 21 ttj .2,1j








jj ttn           (4a) 
         .,,,,,, 21221122122111 ttRttRWttRttRW       (4b) 
We now consider the equilibrium allocation for the first stage. The first order 
conditions are as follows for 1, 2j  : 
       
2
1
0.j j j j ij j j j j ij i
ij j j j j
R x x g
n A Q n x A Q n B L g




                            
   (4c) 
Differentiating equations (4a) and (4b) with respect to 
2,1jj
t yields equations (2c) and  
     11 12 1 22 12 2 ,j jW W R t W W R t        .2,1j      (4d) 
Since   0 jmmm WW  and   ,0 jj tR  2,1, mj  and ,mj   equations (4d) imply 






















































Adding up equations (4c) and (4e) yields 


















































 .2,1j  (4f) 
Combining equations (4a) and (4f), we obtain: 

































 .2,1j    (4g) 
The equilibrium allocation for the decentralized leadership is characterized by equations 
(1b), (1c), (2a), (2b) and (4g).  
Proposition 2.  The subgame perfect equilibrium for the decentralized leadership game 
corresponds to the center’s most preferred allocation. 
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 Proposition 2 follows from the fact that the redistributive policy implemented by 
the center provides the forward looking regional governments with incentives to 
internalize all externalities. To see this, consider the center's optimal redistribution rule 
(4b):    1 1 2 2 1 2, , .W R R W R R This condition can be used to express the welfare level of 
region 1 as an implicit function of the welfare level of region 2 (or vice-versa). Let 
 1 2 ,R R  where    is the implicit function. Then, the center's optimal redistribution 
rule can be rewritten as      1 2 2 2 2 2, , .W R R W R R    Differentiating this equation 
with respect to 2R  yields      2 22 12 11 21 0R W W W W     , since 0jjW   and 
0,jm mjW W   , 1, 2,j m   .j m  Thus, the center's optimal redistribution rule implies 
that one region's welfare level is an increasing function of the other region's welfare level. 
Knowing that the optimal redistributive rule will align regional welfare levels in the 
second stage, it is rational for each regional government in the first stage to make a 
choice with respect to the rate at which capital should be taxed in its region which 
internalizes all externalities. 
4.3 Centralized Leadership 
Suppose now that the center is the Stackelberg leader and the regions are the Stackelberg 
followers. Caplan and Silva (1999) considered a similar federal setting motivated by 
environmental policy making in the United States. 
Applying backward induction, we first consider the second stage of the game. 
Since the region’s problem is identical to the problem it solved in section 4.1, the 
equilibrium conditions for regions’ maximization problems are characterized by 
equations (1b), (1c) and (3b) provided the solutions are interior. 
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Let   21,jt , ,2,1j  denote the regional optimal policy responses. Let us also 
define        ,,,,, 21221121  ttgg jj           1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2, , , , ,j j jk k t t        
             ,,,,,,, 2121212121  mjjjj ggLBGQAxU    
     1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2, , ,G g g        and    ,,, 2121  jjj UnR  .2,1j  
In the first stage of the game, the center chooses  
2,1jj
  to maximize 
    212211 ,,,  RRW  subject to the federation’s resource constraint (2a) and the 




































.2,1j       (5a) 
Because  ,QAnR jjj   ,2,1j  and 0 jiR   ,2,1, ji ,ji   equations (5a) 


























































































     (5b) 
Substituting equations (3a) into equations (5b) yields, 
   
1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1
1 2
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1
.
W R t t W R t t
W W
A Q t n n A Q t n n   
         
                 
   (5c) 
Differentiating equations (3a) with respect to  
2,1jj

























































































      (5d) 
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 2,1, mj  and .mj   Substituting equations 
(5e) into equations (5c), we have 
 
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 1
1 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 1 2
1 2




R R R R R
W W W
A Q t n t t n t t t
R R R R R
W
t n t t n t t t
 
 
                    
                  
   (5f) 
Equation (5f) clearly demonstrates that the center’s interregional income transfer policy 
does not generally achieve the socially equitable goal of equalizing social marginal 
utilities of income. The policy rule implicit in equation (5f) balances the two objectives 
the center attempts to achieve; namely, equity and efficiency. Since the center knows that 
its redistribution policy influences the regions’ tax policies, it finds it optimal to deviate 
from the socially equitable goal of equalizing social marginal utilities of income. Had 
redistribution policy been unable to influence the regions’ tax policies, the center would 
have chosen to equalize social marginal utilities of income. The implied allocation would 
have been identical to the equilibrium allocation we obtained in the setting in which the 
center and the regions make simultaneous choices. Thus, the center’s redistributive policy 
would have been neutral. 
We gather the results we obtained in the paper in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. The subgame perfect equilibrium for the centralized leadership game is 
generally socially inequitable and inefficient. The allocation differs from the subgame 
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perfect equilibrium for the decentralized leadership game and from the Nash equilibrium 
for the simultaneous game played by the center and the regions. The center’s 
redistributive policy is generally non-neutral. 
 By comparing the equilibrium for the decentralized leadership setting with the 
equilibrium for the centralized leadership setting, we are led to the same conclusion of 
Caplan and Silva (1999) that a federal system characterized by decentralized leadership 
may in many instances dominate a federal system characterized by centralized leadership. 
Our model, however, is much more general than the one presented by Caplan and Silva 
(1999). As pointed out by these authors and Caplan et al (2000), among others, the shape 
of federal policy making is sensitive to the timing of the game played by regional and 
central governments. In this paper, we have been able to clearly demonstrate that federal 
policy making under decentralized leadership is socially superior given our specifications 
of individual utilities and regional and federal welfare functions. 
4. Conclusion 
Following early and recent contributions to two important branches of the fiscal 
federalism literature, on transboundary pollution control and interregional tax 
competition, this paper makes contributions to each branch by demonstrating that 
efficient control of transboundary pollutants may be achieved even if regional 
governments do not have lump-sum taxes at their disposal and have thus to resort to tax 
schemes that sacrifice some critical resources, such as capital taxation. When capital 
taxes must be utilized, we show that tax competition is not necessarily wasteful, relative 
to what a fully coordinated system would accomplish, and that decentralized leadership 
may socially dominate alternative federal policy structures. A federal system 
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characterized by decentralized leadership may, therefore, be socially optimal. This 
implies that the prevalent system adopted in the European Union may be superior to its 
alternatives and that much more attention should be devoted to its efficiency and equity 
properties. 
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